A discussion on new cultural and accounting variables and IFRSs’ implementation[:] Empirical study on a sample of Central and Eastern European countries. by Dima, Bogdan & Dima (Cristea), Stefana Maria
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A discussion on new cultural and
accounting variables and IFRSs’
implementation[:] Empirical study on a
sample of Central and Eastern European
countries.
Bogdan Dima and Stefana Maria Dima (Cristea)
12. May 2009
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/27165/
MPRA Paper No. 27165, posted 3. December 2010 20:41 UTC
A DISCUSSION ON NEW CULTURAL AND ACCOUNTING 
VARIABLES AND IFRSs’ IMPLEMENTATION. EMPIRICAL 
STUDY ON A SAMPLE OF CENTRAL AND  
EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
 
Bogdan DIMA, PhD Professor 
Email address: bogdandima2001@gmail.com 
 
Ştefana Maria DIMA (CRISTEA), PhD Lecturer  
Email address: stefana_cristea@yahoo.it  
 
ABSTRACT  
 
In the context of a growing literature addressing the connection between cultural variables and 
accounting regulations, the general objective of this paper is to provide a theoretical discussion 
and empirical evidence on the recent trends in financial reporting on a sample of CEE 
countries. Thus, the specific objectives of the paper are: 1) to provide an operational definition 
of culture; 2) to advance a set of cultural variables that we consider relevant for the   
interactions between culture and the implementation of accounting regulations; (3) to 
“translate” these variables into a set of specific accounting  variables  built from a 
“functional” perspective; 4) to test four hypotheses based on the empirical pool data. The 
dependent variable is a dummy aiming to capture the specificity of IFRSs’ endorsement for 
unlisted entities in CEE countries and the explanatory variables are our own accounting 
variables based on a set of  cultural ones derived from World Values Survey’s questions. The 
main output of the paper consists in the thesis that the culture in general and the specific 
accounting values in particular are relevant for the national characteristics of IFRSs’ 
implementation in the sample countries. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Starting with the influential work of Harrison & McKinnon (1986) and Gray (1988), a growing 
literature addresses the issue of the connections between culture and accounting regulations and 
attempts to explain and predict, by using such variables, the international differences in 
financial reporting systems. Several studies have tested Gray's hypothesis including Pourjalali & 
Meek (1995) which identifies a match between changes in cultural dimensions and the 
accounting environment in Iran following the 1979 revolution. On the other hand, Amat, Blake, 
Wraith & Oliveras (1999) link Spain’s national culture to the characteristics of the Spanish 
accounting environment; and Dunn (2002) concludes that cultural and political barriers are 
some of the most important limitative factors for the international accounting harmonization. 
 
Thus, the general objective of this paper is to provide a simple theoretical framework and some 
empirical evidence within the fervent debate over the recent developments in Central and 
Eastern European (CEE) countries’ financial reporting. The paper is organized as follows: 
Section 1 provides an operational definition of culture as the dominant collective mental model 
that distinguishes a society from another through a learning and inter-generational transmission 
process. Moreover, this section consists of a literature review on the connection between culture 
and accounting and of a discussion on several particularities of IFRSs’ implementation in the 
European Union (EU). Section 2 advances a set of cultural variables that we consider relevant 
for the interactions between culture and the implementation of accounting regulations in general 
and it provides a “translation” of these cultural variables into specific accounting ones from a 
functional perspective, by identifying several of their specific determinants. Section 3 attempts 
to provide an empirical support for the thesis of significant connections between the accounting 
variables and the financial reporting on the sample of CEE countries by identifying some 
particularities of the accounting regulations in the sample countries and testing four hypotheses 
based on the empirical pool data; Section 4 includes final conclusions consisting in derived 
comments, (auto)critic and further research directions. 
 
Therefore, the main output of the paper consists in the thesis that culture in general and the 
specific accounting values in particular are relevant for the national characteristics of 
International Financial Reporting Standards’ (IFRSs) implementation in the sample countries. 
 
1. THE CONCEPTUAL BACKGROUND 
 
1.1. An Operational Definition of Culture  
 
According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, culture is “the act of developing by education, 
discipline, and social experience” or “training or refining of the moral and intellectual 
faculties”. In a different view, Cozzi (1998) understands by culture a “social asset” whose 
acquisition by an agent generates no individual utility but has positive external effects. 
UNESCO (1992)i has described culture as follows: "... culture should be regarded as the set of 
distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual and emotional features of society or a social group, 
and that it encompasses, in addition to art and literature, lifestyles, ways of living together, 
value systems, traditions and beliefs". Such definitions are more focused on the static aspects of 
culture as given social artifacts. However, cultural characteristic are changing over time; the 
content of the shared intellectual products does not remain the same over long time spans. 
Societies are reacting to the variation of the external and internal environment. So that, a more 
comprehensive view of cultural paradigm admits that its architecture is “stable” only in a “short 
enough” time horizon. 
 
Nevertheless, we agree with the definition of cultural paradigm provided in Talpoş et al. (2005: 
20): “Through paradigm we understand the dominant collective mental model that 
individualizes a society from another. This paradigm represents a societal integration factor, by 
offering common values and goals for the members of the society. Also, this represents the 
subject of some learning and inter-generational transmission process, which slowly modifies 
itself, in <long cycles>”. 
 
Hence, we consider the cultural paradigm as representing much more then a set of “shared 
values”. Similarly, one could remark that an interesting definition of culture as “shared values” 
was given in 1952 by Kroeber & Kluckhohn (cited in Adler, 1986). According to them, culture 
consist of patterns, explicit and implicit of and for behaviors acquired and transmitted by 
symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiment 
in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and 
selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be 
considered products of action, on the other conditioning elements of future action. 
 
In consequence, culture is: 
♦ Something that is shared by all or almost all members of a social group; 
♦ Something that the older members of the group try to pass on to the younger members; and 
♦ Something (as in the case of morals, laws and customs) that shapes behavior, or structures 
one’s perception of the world. 
From this point of view, our vision is much closer to Hofstede (1991) who defines culture as 
“the collective programming of the mind which distinguishes the members of one group or 
category of people from another”. Like him, we emphasize that culture is, at least partially, 
learned, and not only inherited. 
 
The key points of our argumentation may be resumed as follows: (1) the accounting standards 
could be seen as “cultural artifacts”; (2) their implementation depends on the specificities of the 
“accounting sub-paradigm”. 
Accounting is not only a business function but also an expression of the societal concern for the 
nature and quality of production and distribution mechanisms as well as for their impact at a 
global scale. Therefore, the setting of a given set of financial reporting standards is influenced 
by the “institutional” consequences of cultural paradigm such as legal system (especially the 
pattern of property rights), the production structures and relationships, the “safety networks” 
(such as social security, pensions, etc.) or the social output distribution mechanisms. In other 
words, the architecture of the accounting standards will vary over the main societal axes 
depending on the society’s approaches to questions like the “natural” or “given” social subjects 
rights, the organization of the economic system, the social power relations and the treatments of 
marginal/ discriminated / disadvantaged social groups, the social reactions to societal risks and 
uncertainty. The adoption of norms, rules and regulations (including the accounting ones) could 
be done in a different institutional framework shaped by different societal values and 
preferences. Using our own terminology, we could label different approaches to the design this 
institutional framework as: 
• The leadership case - the regulations are issued under the influence of the societal 
leadership centers and reflects their “long term” interests; 
• The technocracy case - the regulations are the products of “technocratic” bodies supposed 
to control the expertise in the involved fields of social issues; 
• The business case - the regulations are business issued and derived directly from the 
practice; 
• The politic case - the regulations are deriving from the activity of the formal political 
legislative and executive centers and they emerge as a result of political consensus / 
compromise. 
 
The society will set a certain configuration of the hierarchical relations between these possible 
cases and entrust a certain social mandate to the involved bodies according to its specific 
cultural values. So, the regulations are linked to the cultural paradigm from the first moment of 
their elaboration and issuance. 
But such influences of culture on regulatory framework are not limited to the elaboration 
processes: thus, they should be equally emphasized in the implementation ones. Since societal 
culture as a whole is a collective model adjusted in “long cycles”, the transposition of the 
regulations in practice will inter alia depend on the particular “sub-cultures” of the entities 
endorsing those regulations. The respective “sub-models” derive from the general paradigm, but 
these are more flexible and more predisposed to change under the impact of the current 
conditions. For instance, from an institutional and structural perspective, the accounting 
standards will be the product of the global cultural values; but their implementation and 
functional results will be much more connected to the specific accounting values. In this sense, 
each study on the practical use of the standards should include a backward analysis – going 
from the functional aspects as they are modeled by the accounting values to the broader 
contextual influence of the global cultural values. 
 
With these features, a compact model of the regulation mechanisms could be formally 
described as: 
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where 
ti
r is a state variable which describes the regulatory conditions for a certain issue i in the 
current period t; I* is an output index describing the results in the presence of regulations as I 
status for the output index in the absence of such regulations; ka are the current adoption costs 
for the regulatory set as k describes the imposing/supervising/punishing costs. C is a set of 
cultural variables characteristics of the paradigm; ε is a “black box” which counts for the 
influence of other “hidden” variables; and λ1, λ2 are the relative sensitivity coefficients. 
 
We assuming that I* could be written as: 
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where β is a discount factor, φI  is a state effect that captures the role played by “fix” elements 
able to affect the regulations’ impact and ηI measures the “omitted” specific factors. As a 
further step, we suppose that the expected future output could be predicted inside a mix 
mechanism by incorporating both past and current valuesii: 
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where L is the lag operator. 
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with φk  the “fix” component of maintaining the regulations and 
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Since cultural variables adjust in “long cycle”, it is possible to consider under a “short enough” 
time period that: ( ) ( )6iit CCE t ≈  
The deviations reflected by εt are a result of the specific particularities on the implementation. 
So that: ( ) ( ) ( )7ttt iSiit CChE ≈≈ε  
where ti
SC describes the “sub-paradigm” of the bodies entrusted with the implementation and 
appliance of the standards and h is the “translation function” from “general” to “particular” 
(from the characteristics of the general paradigm to the elements of the involved “sub-culture”). 
Relations (1) - (7) could be combined in order to obtain: 
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According to relation (8), it could be formulated the next general hypothesis of the proposed 
analysis: 
H: In caeteris paribus conditions the regulatory status of an individual issue will vary 
according with the “sub-paradigm” of the bodies involved in the implementation/application of 
the specific standards. 
 
1.2. How Does Culture Interfere with Accounting? 
  
The purpose of this section is to review the main international studies referring to how culture 
interferes with financial reporting. Thus, we will make reference to Hofstede’s cultural 
dimensions model (Hofstede, 1980, 1991, 2001) and then to Gray’s accounting values.   
 
Hofstede and the key cultural dimensions  
 
Considered to be the father of the cultural dimensions modeling, Hofstede (2001:1) specified 
that culture “manifests itself not only in values, but in more superficial ways: in symbols, 
heroes, and rituals”. Beginning from such a premise, Hofstede created a model in which cultural 
differences and their consequences on national, regional and international level can be 
described. Based on an attitude survey of a multinational entity’s employees (IBM) in 66 
countries during the 1970s, Hofstede developed country-based indices corresponding initially to 
four dimensions of national culture for each and every country surveyed, later on adding a 
further dimension (Hofstede & Bond, 1988) – which all were meant to reflect Eastern and 
Western values alike.  
 
These key dimensions may be described as follows: 
• Power distance - represents the extent to which the less powerful members of a society 
accept that power is unequally distributed; 
• Individualism - describes individualistic societies as communities where there are few ties 
beyond those of the nuclear family, while the opposite societies - collectivist - are 
characterized by stronger cohesive in-group ties; 
• Masculinity - opposes “masculine” societies and “feminine” societies. In the first case, 
men are confident, tough, and more concerned with material and professional success, 
while women are modest and more concerned in the quality of life, by being. In  the other 
case, both men and women are equally concerned with quality of life; 
• Uncertainty avoidance – reflects the extent to which people feel threatened by 
unknown/uncertain situations; 
• Long-term pragmatism - represents the extent to which people favor a pragmatic vision 
over a short-term thinking. In order to design this dimension Hofstede undertook a 
Chinese Value Survey.  
 
In spite of the long time success of the model and of the numerous business-related and 
psychological research studies either based on or validating it (Hoppe, 1990; Sondergaard, 
1994; Barkema & Vermeulen, 1997, Ding, Jeanjean & Stolowy, 2004), this cultural dimensions 
model has been constantly challenged respectively criticized by several researchers (Bond, 
1988; Smith, Dugan, & Trompenaars, 1996 respectively by Gernon & Wallace, 1995; 
Baskerville, 2003). For instance, whereas Smith, Dugan & Trompenaars (1996) analyzed the 
replicability of Hofstede’s methodologies, Gernon & Wallace (1995) debated over the 
application of Hofstede’s cultural dimensions.  
Among the criticisms brought to the Hofstede’s approach there are: the survey was referring to 
one organization and may not be applicable to other circumstances (Gernon & Wallace, 1995:  
85); “the embedded-ness of the four dimensions in the social, political or economic measures 
indicates that the dimensions […] describe characteristics of different nations, most of which 
could be identified as socio-economic in origin” (Baskerville, 2003); the IBM data are now 
obsolete. To the last of these criticisms, Hofstede (2001:73) replied that because the dimensions 
were supposed to have centuries-old roots, only the stable data from his surveys had been kept. 
 
Gray and the accounting values 
 
Based on Hofstede’s model, Gray (1988) introduced the first four cultural dimensions into 
accounting, by creating the following accounting values: 
• Professionalism versus statutory control - refers to a preference for the use of individual 
professional judgment and the preservation of professional self-regulation over the option 
to comply with the regulatory requirements and statutory control; 
• Uniformity versus flexibility - implies a preference for the enforcement of standardized 
accounting practices and the consistent use of these over time versus a preference for 
flexible practices in accordance with the particular circumstances in which an individual 
company may operate; 
• Conservatism versus optimism - opposes a preference for a cautious approach to 
measurement which will allow a company to handle easier uncertain future events, versus 
a risk-taking approach. 
• Secrecy versus transparency - describes a preference for disclosure of financial 
information only to those closely involved with the management of the respective 
company, seldom resulting in a restricted access for the other interested categories as 
opposed to a more transparent, open and publicly accountable approach. 
1.3. Some of the Particularities of IFRSs’ Implementation in the European Union 
 
The European accountancy undertakes the most significant revolution since the issuance of the 
IVth Directive in 1978. Since 2005, IAS Regulation (Regulation No.1606/2002/EC) has required 
European companies listed in a European securities market to use International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRSs) for preparing their consolidated financial statements. This 
requirement affected almost 8000 European listed companies. In addition, Article 5 of the IAS 
Regulation allows Member States to permit or require the unlisted entities to draw up their 
individual and consolidated financial statements according to IAS.   
 
There is no doubt that IAS Regulation and the subsequent Directives on financial reporting 
share a common vision on the link between international accounting harmonization/ 
convergence and globalization. The first concept could be perceived as an internationalization 
of accounting by promoting accounting standards in which the global interest prevails in front of 
the national one (Volker, 2000; Cooke, 2001). The evolution of an increasingly real and 
nominal integrated global economy, the changes in the architecture of the international financial 
system, the predominance of multinational entities, the consequences of technological and 
informational transfers - all these require an increased harmonization of the accounting 
practices. Thus, IFRSs arise as a product of the globalization forces, becoming the best choice 
for many national authorities in ensuring transparency and comparability of the financial 
information. The main reason for this is the fact that a “symbolic economy” implies uniform 
mechanisms for efficiency estimation, since the economic subjects are in a certain sense 
“detached” from the objects of their decisions.  
 
Some years ago it became obvious that a choice must be made between US GAAP and, 
respectively, IAS/IFRSs. However, in the last decade, IFRSs have gained a wider acceptance, 
so that nowadays almost 110 countries around the world have adopted the issued version or plan 
to adopt or converge with this set of standards with some different modifications / limitations. 
In this context, FASB and IASB are determined to find a mutual compromise of adopting 
compatible and high quality solutions for present and future accounting issues. For this purpose, 
two memorandums of understanding were signed during the years (2002 – Norwalk Agreement; 
2006). Still, the convergence process is far from being complete and there is not a clear short-
run perception for a single international set of standards compatible with both sets of standards. 
 
For the proposed analysis, the identification of IFRSs’ main characteristics is essential. Thus, 
we have structured some of the features as follows:   
• A formal set of regulations with a clearly structural internal organization of the information 
and a uniform prescription of the accounting treatments to be applied; 
• A “multi-authority” decisional result since a large number of bodies is involved (IASC  
Foundation that names the members of the Board and IFRIC, IASB which issues the 
standards, IFRIC responsible with the issuance of standards’ interpretations, SAC which 
provides advisory support – all these being separate but interlinked structures; the European 
Commission with its entire network of bodies with analysis and advisory duties – EFRAG, 
TEG, SARG, ARC, Contact Committee, roundtable; the national regulators and so on); 
• A product of a specific cultural and business environment - the Anglo-Saxon one - destined 
to be assimilated in various other environments characterized by different cultural 
paradigms; 
• The IFRSs appliance is a “work in progress” under a significant time horizon so that there 
are some limitations of the “short-run” argument. 
 
If these postulates stand, it should be noted that in the particular case of the CEE countries 
which are EU Member States, a discriminate analysis is applicable only for domestic unlisted 
entities since all the listed companies are required to use IFRSs. In this context becomes obvious 
that the decision of the CEE countries - UE Member States – to permit or require the domestic 
unlisted entities to draw up their individual financial statements according to IAS/IFRS is still 
question to the cultural particularities of each state. 
 
2. BUILDING NEW SETS OF CULTURAL AND ACCOUNTING VARIABLES  
 
2.1. Building a New Set of Cultural Variables  
 
The starting point of our research is represented by the observation that Gray’s accounting 
values (1988) have a „structural” nature. More precisely, these describe the organization of the 
accounting framework, the institutional network, the accounting regulations and rules’ setting as 
well as the relative preferences in accounting treatments, transparency, completeness and risk 
aversion.  
Due to the complexity and variety of the real situations, such an approach generates difficulties 
in the measurement of accounting values and explains the non-homogeneous results of the 
different studies carried on this issue.  
      
Since Gray (1988) has linked his accounting values to Hofstede’s cultural dimensions model, 
numerous researchers were inspired to find empirical evidence on the subject (Belkaoui, 1989; 
Perera, 1989; Perera & Mathews, 1990; Chow, Chau, & Gray, 1995; Hussein, 1996; MacArthur, 
1996; Roberts & Salter, 1999). Salter & Niswander (1995) tried to test Gray’s theory on a 
sample of 29 countries, but the study revealed serious problems in the measurement of the 
accounting values, the results including a negative relationship between uniformity and 
uncertainty avoidance, in contrast to Gray’s prediction. On the other hand, Chanchani & Willet 
(2004) tested the accounting values on the financial statements’ uses in India and New Zeeland 
and their results validated in some way Gray’s hypotheses concerning professionalism and 
uniformity.  
 
In this context, a possible alternative approach may consist in the attempt to describe the 
accounting values from a functional perspective. In other words, we consider starting not from 
the description of the financial reporting system, but from the way it is actually endorsed. This 
presumes shifting the focus from norms and institutions to norms’ implementation mechanisms 
and the assessment of their relative efficiency. The minimal steps of such an approach include: 
1. to identify the common functional characteristics of the contemporary financial reporting 
systems; 
2. to identify the discriminants which explain the existing differences among these systems; 
3. to emphasize the estimation modalities of the informational efficiency of the financial 
reporting systems and those of the principles which may lay at the base of the empirical 
assessment of these.  
 
It can be noticed that such an approach may imply a high doze of subjectivism, since the 
appraisal of the way in which the financial reporting systems are structured and work is shaped 
by the set of relative preferences of the standard setters and main financial information’ users.  
In consequence, the cultural paradigm in which these systems are conceived and implemented 
plays a critical role in their ex ante and ex post assessment. Thus, defining a set of accounting 
values must take into consideration the accurate manifestation of the constituents of this 
paradigm. Or, the appeal to the cultural dimensions proposed by Hofstede (1980, 1991, 2001) 
may generate a series of difficulties among which their Western focused nature and, on the other 
hand, the problems associated to their operationalization. A solution to this problem is 
represented by the use of World Values Surveys’ (WVSs) data. 
 
In 1981, Jan Kerkhofs and Ruud de Moor - leaders of the European Values Survey group (EVS) 
- launched a study which will turn into today’s World Values Surveys. Because of the success 
of the EVS’ surveys carried out in ten West European societies, the project was replicated in 
fourteen additional countries. The findings of these surveys suggested that “predictable cultural 
changes were taking place”. 
Nowadays, The World Values Surveyiii is organized as a network of social scientists brought 
together by a common interest: “to understand ongoing social changes that are transforming 
peoples' worldviews and basic motivations”. It is coordinated by a central body, the World 
Values Survey Association, which is a non-profit association seated in Stockholm, Sweden. 
Also, the WVSs’ data have become increasingly renowned in recent years, and have been used 
in hundreds of publications in more than twenty languages.   
 
To monitor the cultural changes, four waves of Values Surveys were carried out in 1981, 1990-
1991, 1995-1996 and 1999-2001, while a fifth wave took place in 2005-2006. The World 
Values surveys were designed to test the hypothesis that economic and technological changes 
are changing the basic values and motivations of people. This database allows the examination 
of relationships between public values and economic growth; or between environmental 
pollution and mass attitudes toward environmental protection; or those between political culture 
and democratic institutions. The usefulness of these data has grown as the surveys are now 
providing a wider coverage of the world's societies, and as the time coverage increased. The last 
wave includes more than 80 independent countries amounting to almost 85% of the world's 
population. 
 
Based on the WVSs’ data, we have selected those questions which influence in a direct manner 
the financial reporting systems and have subsequently transposed these generic values in 
specific accounting values. This approach in three steps has the following advantages: 
a. provides a consistent explanation on conceptual level of the way in which the mechanisms 
subordinated to the accounting systems are designed; 
b. explains how the cultural values adjustable on long cycles are susceptible to influence the 
organization and functionality of financial reporting, which is object to much faster 
transformations in medium and short cycles; 
c. allows the operationalization and testing of explicative models built based on these 
values; 
d. allows the formulation of  normative statements based on emphasizing the best practices.  
 
It is important to emphasize the fact that the translation of the WVSs’ data in accounting values 
can be facilitated by a set of “intermediary cultural values” as a result of selecting those cultural 
data potentially susceptible to influence the accounting systems. Their nature of “transitional 
variables” derives from the fact that these are not actually principles incorporated in the basis of 
the financial reporting systems, rather representative descriptors of the configuration of 
standard setters’ relative preferences.   
 
Thus, in our paper we have built such a set of transitional variables based on WVSs’ data. In 
this matter we are referring to the fourth wave of surveys carried out by WVSs in 1999-2001 in 
sixty five societies, many African and Islamic societies being included in the analysis for the 
first time. 
 
Insert Table 1 
 
We have grouped these questions according to their specificity, afterwards proceeding at 
building a specific set of cultural variables with impact on financial reporting:  
 
1. Freedom of initiative - estimates the relative importance of free individual initiatives on 
personal level and within economic structures. The variable is defined as “ the individual 
initiative is NOT important” and is measured as: 
( )9
034
100ln*33.0
016
100ln*33.0
173
100ln*33.0 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
CCA
nofreedom  
 
2. Work significance - takes into account the relative importance of work during the 
individual life time. It could be noticed that this variable is more focused on importance of 
work and less on work ethics. The variable is computed as “work is NOT important”: 
( )10
005
100ln ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
A
nowork  
 
3. Social hierarchy significance - describes the relative acceptance of social hierarchy defined 
as “In society and in economic entities the hierarchical managerial style DOES NOT 
prevail”:  
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4. Social justice significance - intents to capture the importance that justice and “follow the 
rules” behavior have in the social game. The variable is defined as “The social justice and 
the social norms and rules are NOT important” and computed as follows: 
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5. Risk aversion – describes the attitude towards risk at social and individual level and is 
defined as “ The job security and the capacity to improve the immediate family life are 
NOT important” being computed as: 
( )13
163
100ln*5.0
100
013ln*5.0 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛=
E
Csionnoriskaver  
 
2.2. Building a Correlated Set of Accounting Variables  
 
A subsequent step derives from the necessity to transform these transitional values in 
accounting values. Such a procedure must be based at least on the following rules: 
• The final outcome has to be a “positive” one and not a normative one. More precisely, it 
must be avoided the a priori establishment of those principles which might generate the first 
order best solution for the architecture of the financial reporting systems. Instead it must 
refer to the main objective - the elaboration of a set of variables whose descriptive capacity 
is maximal; 
• The final outcome must have a strong operational nature. More precisely, the way in which 
the accounting variables are defined must allow their easier assessment and reflect the 
possible changes in their value during different periods of analysis; 
• The new accounting variables have to be auto consistent, to avoid ambiguities in classifying 
the financial reporting systems and maintain a bi-univocal correlation with the transitional 
variables which generated them; 
• The new accounting values must present a minimal informational discrepancy in 
comparison with the cultural paradigm. We must keep in mind that the accounting values 
have to allow “cross-system comparisons” among financial reporting systems from distinct 
economic, social and cultural environments. Hence, it is essential to pursue the achievement 
of a more extensive nature of these values as well as the preservation of their explanatory 
potential in comparison with the need to distinguish between “hard” economic and 
institutional determinants and respectively “soft” social and cultural determinants which 
shape the architecture of the accounting systems; 
• The accounting values must focus on emphasizing the functional aspects specific to 
financial reporting systems. Of course, it is a less plausible possibility to completely neglect 
the institutional aspects and the links between the inherent mechanisms of these systems. 
So, this request can be formulated in a weaker version namely as the informational weight 
of the functional descriptors in the accounting values to be prevalent.  
 
Such a set of accounting values may be formed of: 
1. Functional conformism - the application of norms, regulations and procedures is done 
faithfully according to their formal description. This variable is interlinked to freedom of 
initiative: the less important the individual initiatives are, the higher the degree of functional 
conformism. In this context, the accounting norms will be applied “as such” in a 
homogeneous manner  and particular situations tend to be avoided; 
2. Functional transparency - the application of norms, regulations and procedures is 
accomplished with the purpose of gathering, synthesizing and transmitting a greater volume 
of financial information. This variable is interlinked to work significance: the more 
important the work is, the more profound the tendency to reach a detailed understanding of 
the financial statements to the prejudice of rapidity in gathering and use of financial 
information.  
3. Hierarchical selectivity - the information gathered in a given financial reporting system is 
allocated in a partitioned manner according to the existing hierarchical structure. This 
variable is interlinked to social hierarchy significance: the more rigid the hierarchy is, the 
less transparent the informational circuit; the more synthetic information is reserved to the 
higher hierarchical levels; 
4. Social subordination – the organization and function of the accounting systems is meant to 
facilitate not only the achievement of economic and financial objectives but also the 
fulfillment of assumed obligations towards the community in conformity with the corporate 
social responsibility. This variable is interlinked to social justice significance: the more 
important the respecting of the norms and rules of the “social game” is, the more the 
accounting systems must emphasize not only the standard economic performance but also 
the impact that the economic entities have on the social environment; 
5. Cautious approach - the application of norms, regulations and procedures is done in order 
to minimize the risks of producing errors and incomplete, distorted and obsolete/ untimely 
information. This variable is interlinked to risk aversion: the deeper the social and 
individual tendency to reject risks is, the more focus is on the completeness, accuracy, auto-
consistency and relevance of the output of financial information’s gathering and 
administration.  
 
 
2.3. Identifying the Particularities of the Proposed Accounting Variables  
 
In this paragraph we intend, on one hand, to explain the relative preference for the proposed 
accounting variables referring to Hofstede’s cultural dimensions as determinants of this 
preference, and on the other to emphasize certain similarities to Gray’s model.  
 
 Functional conformism 
In general, conformism could be defined as “the inclination of an individual to change 
spontaneously (without any order or request by anyone) his judgments and (or) actions to 
conform the <socially prevailing> judgments and (or) actions” (Luzzati, 1999, 113). In the 
context of our proposed value, conformism could be understood as an auto-limitation of the 
accounting practitioners to adopt “independent” attitudes in respect to the regulatory framework 
and to exercise their professional judgment to discriminate between the individual cases of 
norms, rules and procedures’ applications. This should be seen as a separate issue from the 
matter of the extent to which the accounting profession should be subject to a public statutory 
control: once the regulations are issued, no matter in what way, a functional conformist attitude 
implies an implementation as per se without any “deviations” generated by adaptations to 
practical cases.  
 
The degree of conformism decreases with an increase in the social importance of freedom of 
initiative: “A preference for independent professional judgment is consistent with a preference 
for a loosely knit social framework where there is more emphasis on independence, a belief in 
individual decisions and respect for individual endeavour” (Gray, 1988, 9). 
However, these two aspects are inter-linked: the more self-regulated the accounting practice is, 
the greater the possibilities to adjust the rules to a complex field of application and to exercise 
an individual professional judgment.  
 
Currently, there is an important controversy in the developed countries about the limits of the 
private self-regulations. For instance, in the Anglo-Saxon area there is a long tradition for the 
development of professional associations and a lower level of conformism (our measure 
suggests that the degree of conformism is more reduced in United States that in United 
Kingdom). But this started to change under the impact of the recent financial instability and as a 
response to numerous financial frauds reported after the longest sustained period of economic 
expansion of United States economy. As Arthur Levitt, the ex-SEC chairman, had noticed in a 
PBS / FRONTLINE 2002 interview a case like Enron “it's symptomatic of a breakdown of the 
ethical values of business over a period of perhaps 20 years, a gradual erosion of business ethics 
that brought us to an Enron, but might very well bring us to a whole host of Enrons as we move 
down the road”.  
In this context, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) created the Public Company Accounting and 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) in order to respond to the concerns that self-regulation of the 
accounting profession had failed to protect investors from poor quality audits. The objective was 
to improve the accounting practices, to strengthen the rules that assured the independence of 
corporate auditors, to increase the accountability of company managers and to enhance the 
quality of financial reports issued by public companies. After six years, the results are still 
mixed, with notable improvements in the financial reports’ quality but with an increase in 
associated costs, a larger number of bureaucratic procedures and more frequent restatements. 
Furthermore, reviewed firms have advance notice of PCAOB inspections, and as a result they 
may still be able to hide deficiencies from the inspectors. It could be predicted that the actual 
financial crisis will boost the changes and will lead to an increased importance of the PCAOB 
(and others bodies) in the supervisory process. Of course, one of the most important issues will 
remain the fact that US GAAP are mainly “rule-based”, being a set of complex and detailed 
accounting rules that leave little room for individual judgment, in opposition with more 
“principle-based” IFRSs. 
 
In the European Union’s Member States the situation is more heterogeneous, but generally there 
is a greater focus on exact implementation of an extended set of prescriptive legal requirements. 
Of course, we must consider the harmonization impact exercised by the European Union’s 
Directives. Among them, the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID - Directive 
2004/39/EC) subsequently amended (Directive 2008/10/EC), that provides a harmonized 
regulatory regime for investment services across the 30 Member States of the European 
Economic Area (the 27 Member States of the European Union plus Iceland, Norway and 
Liechtenstein), appears to be the cornerstone of the European Commission's Financial Services 
Action Plan. The main objectives of the Directive are to increase competition and customer 
protection in investment services and to introduce the concept of “maximum harmonization” 
which places more emphasis on home state supervision.  
 
 Functional transparency 
The participants at a 2002 "Enhancing Financial Transparency” symposium organized by 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation have argued : “One of the largest problems facing 
today's investors is that poor quality financial reports preclude effective, informative 
fundamental analysis. The reasons for inaccurate financial reporting are varied - a small, but 
dangerous, minority of companies actively intends to defraud the investor, while others may set 
forth information that is misleading but technically conforms to legal standards”iv. The 
transparency of the financial statements acts on the economic output, social productivity and the 
value-added by economic entities and sectors through various channels: (a) investments’ 
selection - the identification of better resources allocation’ decisions by taking into account the 
return to risk ratio; (b) the reduction of informational asymmetry; (c) the accountancy of 
managerial decisions from the shareholders and stockholders point of view. In our opinion, 
transparency is a multi-level concept connected with: (1) the completeness of data - the volume 
of information shared to the public should be as large as possible, the referring time-span should 
cover a large enough historical period and the complexity of the financial statements should 
ensure the necessary disclosures; (2) the easy access - the information should be provided in 
such manner that the public could access it without supporting the supplementary costs 
searching for / waiting for / obtaining it; (3) the understandability - the data should be displayed 
in the simplest and most logic form, keeping the redundancy and the technical, unnecessary 
elements under a “critical level”; (4) the reliability – the accuracy of the data should be 
preserved along with their auto-consistency. 
 
Since any economic decision based on financial information will imply the increase of “hidden 
costs” and risks of failure with a decrease in transparency, it could be argued that the social 
relative preference for improving the transparency of the financial statements will be greater in 
countries with a greater preference for uncertainty avoidance. A debatable aspect is the linkage 
between transparency and uniformity of accounting standards and reporting procedures: the 
existence of a detailed regulatory written set and its rigid application does not necessary mean 
that the output will be always complete, easy to access, comprehensible and reliable, if by 
construction it is destined to be opaque. And even more, the set may be designed to fulfill the 
necessary characteristics to ensure a high degree of transparency however, when transposed in 
practice it could be applied formally correct, but denatured or obscure in content. Finally, 
functional transparency may be seen as a result of respecting the rules if these rules are built 
according to the transparency principle.   
 
The “field situation” varies from one country to another. For instance, the United States can  be 
described as characterized by a state of “financial reporting complexity” generated by the large 
number of different bodies with interest in the elaboration of accounting standards and norms 
(Financial Accounting Standards Board - FASB-, Emerging Issues Task Force, US Securities & 
Exchange Commission, and American Institute of Certified Public Accountants). Each of these 
bodies has its own agenda with some important differences between them. This fact led to the 
existence of a large corpus of standards, interpretations, opinions, implementation guides, 
industry guides and so on, that range from general to specific and may display some areas of 
inconsistency. Or, in Scott Taub’s words: “Those detailed rules, bright lines, and exceptions in 
the standards and in subsequent interpretations and rulings have often overwhelmed the basic 
principles that underlie many of the accounting standards. Rather than easing implementation 
and promoting greater consistency in reporting as intended, detailed rules and bright lines 
instead may reinforce a focus on blind adherence without due regard to the principles those 
rules are intended to support” (testimony before “The House Financial Services Subcommittee 
on Capital Markets, Insurance and Government Sponsored Enterprises”, March 29, 2006)v. 
 
In the European Union, the Transparency Directive (Directive 2004/109/EC) covers a range of 
issues including dissemination of financial information, notification of major shareholdings and 
new requirements for the content and timing of periodic financial information. The Directive 
confirms the "home country principle", prohibiting other Member States from imposing more 
stringent disclosure requirements on an issuer than those already imposed in its home Member 
State. This is along the same lines as the Prospectus Directive. Still, the Commission’s Action 
Plan on Modernizing Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the EU proposed 
that greater transparency should be required from unlisted companies. 
 
However, in developing countries, the costs associated with IFRSs’ implementation, the poor 
infrastructure, the lack of accountants’ experience, the power of bureaucracy, the corruption and 
the complexity of local situations had determined heterogeneous results in assuring the  
functional transparency. For the moment, the efforts of international bodies such as 
Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of Accounting and 
Reporting (ISAR) are leading only to limited results. 
 
In our opinion, an interesting approach to validating functional transparency is to test it against 
another methodology and check for similarities. For instance, the Milken Institute computes an 
Opacity Index which measures “the costs and preponderance of high-frequency, low-impact 
risks resulting from corruption, a lack of due process, poor regulatory enforcement, and non-
standard reporting practices, each of which adds substantial costs to global business” (Kurtzman 
& Yago, 2008:1).  The Opacity Index ranges from 1 to 100; the higher a country’s score, the 
greater its opacity. Each component of opacity - (C) corruption, (L) legal systems, (E) 
enforcement policies, (A) accounting and disclosure standards, and (R) regulatory quality - is 
rated separately and contributes to the country’s overall opacity rating. The comparative results 
for a common sample of 38 countries (2006-2007 values of the Opacity Index) are displayed in 
Table 2. 
 
Insert Table 2 
One could notice that the ranks reveal a certain degree of compliance with United Kingdom 
appearing as “the most transparent country” and Philippines / Nigeria as “the less transparent 
ones”. Also, the rank decreases as the country income declines (Graphic 1), which is consistent 
with the predicted relative importance for the existence of necessary resources in the 
corresponding standards and mechanisms able to ensure the transparency.  
 
Insert Graphic 1 
 
For European countries, the ranks are quite similar as the Union embraces uniform codes and 
streamlined regulations for corporate governance and company laws.  
 
 Hierarchical selectivity 
 
This variable has some common characteristics with Gray’s secrecy versus transparency. But 
the “secrecy” is linked more to the architecture of the internal / external informational system. 
Hierarchical selectivity is related to a partitioned view of the financial information circuit being 
a reflection of the principle “you know only what you should know”. As Gray (1988:11) argues: 
“secrecy can be linked most closely with the uncertainty-avoidance, power-distance and 
individualism dimensions. A preference for secrecy is consistent with strong uncertainty 
avoidance following from a need to restrict information disclosures so as to avoid conflict and 
competition and to preserve security. A close relationship with power distance also seems likely 
in that high power-distance societies are likely to be characterized by the restriction of 
information to preserve power inequalities. Secrecy is also consistent with a preference for 
collectivism, as opposed to individualism, with its concern for those closely involved with the 
firm rather than external parties. A significant but less important link with masculinity also 
seems likely”. 
 
In more rigid hierarchical managerial structures, there is a pronounced degree of information 
partition: its distribution strictly follows the hierarchical chains; only the chief officers, 
significant stockholders and (just in some cases) the public authorities / main creditors are able 
to perceive “the whole picture”. As a consequence, the financial information has a higher 
asymmetry being less transparent to the personnel, middle and operational management (and to 
some extent to the investors). Also, a lower consideration for the individual initiative allowed 
the  bureaucracy within the companies to have an extended control over the information 
distribution process. 
 
The selectivity is determined by the nature, contents and extent of the “management accounting” 
/“controlling” norms and procedures. The Institute of Certified Management Accountants 
(ICMA) states “A management accountant applies his or her professional knowledge and skill 
in the preparation and presentation of financial and other decision oriented information in such a 
way as to assist management in the formulation of policies and in the planning and control of 
the operation of the undertaking. Management Accountants therefore are seen as the <value-
creators> amongst the accountants. They are much more interested in looking forward and 
taking decisions that will affect the future of the organization, than in the historical recording 
and compliance (scorekeeping) aspects of the profession”. In the “management accounting” / 
“controlling”, information can be gathered from various fields and functions within an 
organization, such as information management, treasury, efficiency auditing, marketing, 
valuation, pricing or logistics. The question is: How is this information distributed along the 
hierarchical chain, what kind of aspects could be known by the operational / middle 
management and what aspects are only reserved to senior officers, shareholders / stakeholders, 
credit institutions, fiscal authorities and others groups of interests?  
 
The problem could be addressed inside the agent theory framework: what type and how much 
information is shared by different substructures of a given entity depends on the “power 
balance” between these. Since a company could be seen as a “nexus” of contracts between 
stockholders as the principal and the top executives and the tiers as agents, it could be argued 
that the so-called Informativeness Principle should be taken into account in establishing the 
degree of informational selectivity. When information is imperfect (asymmetric, non-uniform 
distributed and costly) this principle states that any measure of performance that (on the margin) 
reveals information about the effort level chosen by the agent must be included in the 
compensation contract. This includes, for example, Relative Performance Evaluation – 
measurement relative to other similar agents, so as to filter out some common background noise 
factors, such as fluctuations in demand. By removing some exogenous sources of randomness in 
the agent’s income, a greater proportion of the fluctuation in the agent’s income falls under his 
control, increasing his ability to bear risk. There is therefore an “optimal quantity” of 
information collected in “management accounting” / “controlling” processes that should be 
distributed to the different agents depending on their hierarchical position in respect to the 
principal. Of course, this “optimal” level of distributed information depends, inter alia, on the 
information gathering cost: as this increases, the level of distribution could decrease.  
But the new informational technologies change the situation in terms of levels and structures of 
such costs. For instance, Mahler & Regan's (2005) study of the effect of an agency’s high 
Internet visibility on Congressional oversight was related by the authors to principal-agent 
theory. By reducing the costs of information-gathering by the principal because of the Internet, 
Mahler & Regan found that the control of the agent - the agencies and their outcomes - became 
easier and more effective. Within this framework, a much clearer distinction between selectivity 
and transparency could be drawn: since the degree of transparency is established in an 
“exogenous” manner, the issue of selectivity could be formulated as a “who is receiving what 
type of information” problem.  
 
As Gray (1998: 11) notes: “The extent of secrecy would seem to vary across countries with 
lower levels of disclosure, including instances of secret reserves, evident in the Continental 
European countries, for example, compared to the U.S.A. and U.K.”. Of course, such an 
observation does not directly address the issue of selectivity. But it could be argued that if this is 
completed with a relative preference for more rigid hierarchical structures in the continental 
countries and for more formal relationships with the companies’ tiers, then it constitutes an 
evidence of a higher degree of selectivity. If this statement is true, our measure of selectivity 
should be associated with a greater power distance for these countries (and, to completely agree 
with the arguments exposed in Gray’s quote, with a higher preference for uncertainty avoidance 
and a lower degree for individualism). Some comparative data are reported in Table 3. 
 
Insert Table 3 
 
Surprisingly, these data suggest that the continental European countries display a higher power 
distance, but a lower level of hierarchical selectivity comparative to the United States and 
United Kingdom cases. One possible explanation consists in the contradictory indication from 
the power distance and the “follows the rules” C061 question in the World Values Surveys’ 
questionnaire which is used to compute our measure of selectivity. More exactly, this question is 
formulated as: “C061. - People have different ideas about following instructions at work. Some 
say that one should follow one's superior's instructions even when one does not fully agree with 
them. Others say that one should follow one's superior's instructions only when one is 
convinced that they are right. With which of these two opinions do you agree?” Or, the reported 
percentage in the 1999 survey for the “follow instructions without being convinced” answer 
against “must be convinced first” was 64.5% for United States, 43.5% for Great Britain and 
46.8% for Northern Ireland, compared with 24.8% for Austria, 30.7% for Belgium, 34.6% for 
Germany or 33.3% for France. “Power Distance Index - PDI is the extent to which the less 
powerful members of organizations and institutions accept and expect that power is distributed 
unequally. The PDI represents inequality (more versus less), but defined from below, not from 
above. It suggests that a society's level of inequality is endorsed by the followers as much as by 
the leaders”vi. Having a lower power distance, but a stronger belief in following the superior’s 
instructions, doesn’t seem, at least at an intuitive level, completely consistent; thus, we consider 
that an extensive study should be carried on this topic. 
 
 Social subordination 
 
This value is a measure of the fitting in the Corporate Social Responsibility paradigm (CSR – 
also known as corporate responsibility, corporate citizenship, responsible business and 
corporate social opportunity) for the accounting norms, rules, procedures and for their 
operational application. 
Under the impact of institutional development of the customer’s network, the increased 
influence of the pro-environmental groups and the major shifting in socio-politic attitudes, a 
significant concern for most businesses may be attributable to the community’s expectation, in 
developed countries, for organizations to engage socially beyond the boundaries of their 
commercial interests.  
The Corporate Social Responsibility Network notes that CSR is “about how businesses align 
their values and behavior with the expectations and needs of stakeholders - not just customers 
and investors, but also employees, suppliers, communities, regulators, special interest groups 
and society as a whole. CSR describes a company's commitment to be accountable to its 
stakeholders”vii 
In the broader context of the CSR, the Social accounting (SA- also known as social and 
environmental accounting, corporate social reporting, corporate social responsibility reporting, 
non-financial reporting, sustainability accounting) is the process of communicating the social 
and environmental effects of organizations' economic actions to particular interest groups within 
society and to society as a whole (Gray et al., 1987: IX). According to the Social Audit 
Networkviii social accounting should be: 
• Multi-perspective: encompassing the views of people and groups that are important to the 
organization. 
• Comprehensive: inclusive of all activities of an organization. 
• Comparative: able to be viewed in the light of other organizations and addressing the 
same issues within same organization over time. 
• Regular: done on an ongoing basis at regular intervals. 
• Verified: checked by people external to the organization. 
• Disclosed: readily available to others inside and outside of the organization. 
 
The development of the CSR / SA could be correlated with the degree of societal femininity: the 
societies with a higher concern for “protective” aspects of the social relationships are more 
likely to focus on the social and environmental impact of the companies activities that the more 
performance-oriented masculine ones. Also CSR / SA could be correlated with the collectivism 
degree since societies with higher values of this variable are more interested in the social global 
impact of the companies’ activity. 
In practice, a number of reporting guidelines or standards have been developed to serve as 
frameworks for social accounting, auditing and reporting: 
• AccountAbility’s AA1000 standard, based on John Elkingron’s triple bottom line (3BL) 
reportingix; 
• Accounting for Sustainability's Connected Reporting Framework; 
• Global Reporting Initiative's Sustainability Reporting Guidelines; 
• Verite's Monitoring Guidelines; 
• Social Accountability International's SA8000 standard; 
• Green Globe Certification / Standard; 
• The ISO 14000 environmental management standard; 
• The United Nations Global Compact promotes companies’ reporting in the format of a 
Communication on Progress (COP). A COP report describes the company's 
implementation of the Compact's ten universal principles; 
• The United Nations’ Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International 
Standards of Accounting and Reporting (ISAR) provides voluntary technical guidance on 
eco-efficiency indicators, corporate responsibility reporting and corporate governance 
disclosure; 
• The FTSE Group publishes the FTSE4Good Index, an evaluation of CSR performance of 
companies; 
• The Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) produces the world’s de facto standard in 
sustainability reporting guidelines. Sustainability reporting is the action where an 
organization publicly communicates their economic, environmental, and social 
performance. The GRI’s mission is to make sustainability reporting by all organizations 
as routinely and comparable as financial reporting. The GRI Guidelines are the most 
common framework used in the world for reporting. More than 1000 organizations from 
60 countries use the Guidelines to produce their sustainability reportsx. 
 
It is often argued that there is a contrasted approach in the field of CSR / SA between the United 
States and the European countries (including United Kingdom as a leading force in this topic). 
For instance, as William & Aguilera (2008:9) noticed that a study like Matten & Moon’s (2004) 
“has compared CSR in Europe versus in the United States, and has proposed a conceptual 
framework of <explicit> versus <implicit> CSR, while recognizing that these are matters of 
emphasis, not wholly dichotomous states. They define explicit CSR as that seen in the United 
States, where companies volunteer to address important social and economic issues through 
their CSR policies, in significant part because of less stringent legal requirements than in 
Europe for such things as health care provision, employee’s rights or environmental protection.  
In contrast, in Europe and the UK, responsibility for these issues is undertaken as part of a 
company’s legal responsibilities, and thus CSR is <implicit> in the way the company does 
business”. This argumentation seems to be supported by some empirical evidences as those 
revealed for instance by the FTSE4Good indexes series. 
 
Insert Table 4 
 
Our own measure of social subordination suggests that there are some important differences 
between United States and United Kingdom with closer values of social subordination to the 
continental European countries in the last case. 
 
Insert Table 5 
 
 Cautious approach 
 
“Conservatism or prudence in asset measurement and the reporting of profits is perceived as a 
fundamental attitude of accountants the world over” (Gray, 1988:10). 
The key distinction in defining and measuring a risk is similar to the one between “risk” and 
“uncertainty”. “Risk” is the probability to obtain an unfavorable result of an economic 
decision. “Unfavorable” means that the result is “positive” but lower then the expected one or 
that the result is “negative”. Therefore the risk concept incorporates both the situations of 
“unrealized” results and “losses”. “Uncertainty” means that the observable result deviates (in a 
“positive” or “negative” sense) from the expected one. “Uncertainty” reflects both the situation 
of “unfavorable” results as well as that of “excess results”.  
 
Suppose, for instance, that the returns of a project are “normally” distributed around a certain 
“objective” or “subjective” target value. In such case, three main areas can be delimited: Area 1 
where the returns are positive but lower that the target value, that can be set based on the 
average of the previous values, the average of the sectors’ returns, the “concurrencies average”, 
the interest or inflation rate, the growth rate of the financial markets etc. or can be a pure 
subjective value; Area 2 where the returns are negative and respectively Area 3 where the 
returns are positive and higher that the target value. Area 1 and Area 2 form together the risk 
zone, while all three areas reflect the uncertainty zone. However, the relative importance of 
Area 1 and Area 2 for the risk definition is not the same: the agent will perceive a higher risk 
associated with losses that with values of returns, which are lower that the target but still 
positive. Thus, the cautious application of the accounting standards should at least: (1) estimate 
in a manner as larger as possible the “objective” and “subjective” material, financial and 
informational costs; (2) compute the incomes in a prudent evaluation based on 
“base/pessimistic” scenarios; (3) evaluate the market value of the company in the worst possible 
conditions; (4) treat adequately the values of the financial assets, the marketable and non-
marketable assets and liabilities; (5) incorporate all the relevant aspects for the weighted / 
marginal capital cost estimation; (6) estimate the “fair values” of the receivables and payables. 
 
In the conditions of exponential development of capital markets and intensive financial 
innovations many entities have switched de facto from “accrual accounting practices” (in which 
transactions are booked at historical costs plus or minus accruals) to an approach based on 
“market-values”. So that the accuracy and the capacity to reflect different types of operational 
risks of the accounting information becomes more and more critical for the relevance of the 
financial statements. The so-called Managerial Risk Accounting is concerned with the 
generation, dissemination and use of risk related accounting information to managers within 
organizations to enable them to judge and shape different risks. 
 
A recent evolution is the field of risk / uncertainty prevention and management “was the 
increased importance of risk management and its integration into general management, which 
mainly results from laws and standards concerning internal control systems and requirements 
like the German <Gesetz zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich> (KonTraG, 
Corporate Sector Supervision and Transparency Act), the US-American Sarbanes Oxley Act 
(SOA), or the revised international capital framework (Basel II). For example, the regulations of 
the KonTraG require the board of directors of German capital market oriented companies to 
<take measures to insure that developments that threaten the continued existence of the 
company are recognized early, especially to establish an internal controls system>. This passage 
is being interpreted as an obligation to establish working early warning and enterprise risk 
management systems in German corporations”(Nakada, 2005). 
 
The cautious approach could be seen in a broader sense not only as the avoidance of 
“incomplete”, non-relevant or obsolete financial information, but as the endorsement of 
accounting standards in such manner that this application is able to permit an adequate 
estimation of the “cost of risk”. Of course, as Nakada (2005) notes: “But the <cost of risk> is 
the most complex for several reasons. First of all, thinking of risk as a cost is somewhat abstract. 
While most people understand that risk is something to be controlled, or even minimized, it's 
not natural to think of it as a cost. Second, risk is not represented in GAAP accounting. There 
are no entries in the income statement for <cost of risk> and nothing in the balance sheet that 
represents <stock of risk>. Lacking either intuition or accounting principles, it is no wonder that 
the cost of risk is left behind”. Still, the pressure of financial instability, the negative 
consequences of “window dressing” for the book values, the rapid changes in the market 
evaluations for assets and liabilities should lead to the development of new accounting 
techniques and methods for risk management. 
 
It is trivial to say that cautious is consistent with uncertainty avoidance: a prudent treatment of  
accounting information is consistent with a concern to cope with the uncertainty about current 
and future market values of  patrimonial and incomes / expenditures elements. At the same time, 
it could be argued that there is also a correlation with a degree of conformism: a failure in the 
uniform application of the standards has the potential to create uncertainty in the payoffs for the 
company and its partners (lenders, shareholders, managers, suppliers and customers).  
 
The situation varies in different countries, according to the differences in the rigidity of their 
compliance with the historical cost principle. This leads to various degrees of conservatism in 
Gray’s sense in market and book values measures across countries. The data in Table 6 suggest 
that the connection between the uncertainty avoidance and our measure of cautious is less clear. 
For instance, in the United Kingdom and Ireland a lower level of the first variable may 
correspond to a higher degree of cautious than in certain European continental countries (since 
the World Values Surveys’ data are not complete for the 1999-2000 survey, we could not 
compute this variable for the United States case).  
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Cautious approach is not only an expression of “risk aversion” but rather a “rational” choice in 
standards’ implementation: in a context of increasing complexity of business environment, it is 
vital for decision makers to benefit from accurate non-distortional information and to formulate 
their judgment by evaluating as accurate as possible the different intrinsic and extrinsic risks 
associated with their decisions. 
 
If the accounting values are understood as a “sub-product” of the cultural values, then the 
changes in their contents take place under the impact of the societal and paradigmatic shifts. 
Factors like global competition / real and financial globalization, the new production and 
technologic structures typical for the post industrial society, the mutations in national and 
international power relationships, the development of the environmental conscience and the new 
configurations of the socio-demographic variables act towards modifying all the characteristics 
of the accounting values and the way in which the accounting standards are conceived and 
transposed in practice.   
 
Resuming, Figure 1 includes the accounting values and their determinants. 
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In connection to this set of accounting values a series of observations must be made: 
• These do not reflect the framework, institutions and implementation mechanisms of 
accounting norms, regulations, procedures which are considered as given in an exogenous 
manner. Thus, in the situation of applying those in different institutional architectures, it is 
possible to notice only the ex post consequences of the way the economic systems work and 
not of the determinants of their configuration; 
• By definition to every accounting value is assigned a transitional value. However, it is not 
clear enough if a change in the transitional values leads automatically to a reconfiguration 
of the accounting values; 
•  Formally, the operationalization of these accounting values’ estimation requires the 
adoption of a “translation  strategy”: namely a mechanism through which to a certain level 
of the transitional values corresponds a certain level of accounting values. The simplest 
modality of achieving such a mechanism consists in an attribution at the scale „1/1”: so, for 
adopting a ranking procedure of transitional values’ specific levels in a set of observations, 
for the highest value of the correspondent transitional value, the accounting value receives 
the rank “1” and respectively for the lowest value of this, the accounting value receives the 
rank “0”. An alternative consists in adopting a normalization procedure of the transitional 
values and, based on that, building the estimators of the accounting values as “fuzzy” 
variables. But any of these procedures will imply that the results will be sensitive to the 
selection of the observation data set. In other words, these could vary according to the 
changes in the set’s structure, so that the accounting values should be seen as “ranks” 
(“relative levels”) and not as “absolute levels”. A country will have higher or lower values 
for a particular accounting variable in respect only with the other countries included in the 
observational set. Of course, at limit, this issue could be, at least hypothetically, addressed 
by taking into account a “complete” set of observations. Still, this will not change the fact 
that the interpretation of any value attributed to an accounting variable should be done only 
in an comparative sense; 
• Without a description of cultural paradigms, it is difficult to assess the degree of 
informational discrepancy of these accounting values. If it is admitted, for example, that the 
description of these paradigms is subordinated to World Values Surveys, it remains to be 
tested the way in which the level of the accounting values varies according to the 
differences highlighted by the “ensemble” of the elements revealed by the survey; 
• In comparison with Gray’s model, there is a focus shift towards the functional aspects 
specific to the financial reporting systems. However, the definition of the proposed 
accounting values still maintains references to the institutional characteristics - obvious 
mainly in the case of the first three values, as well as for the last of the variables. We insist 
on the fact that in making these values operational, the estimation methods must focus 
above all on the way in which  accounting norms and regulations are applied and less on the 
formal stipulations of these, on the role of individual professional judgment and degree of 
flexibility accepted in their implementation; 
• By the functional definition manner, the accounting values do not permit an immediate 
estimation of informational efficiency. To increase this possibility, it is necessary to 
additionally consider the following: a) to complete with a definition of this type of 
efficiency in comparison with the normative aspects that lay at the base of the financial 
reporting systems and respectively b) to formulate a testing methodology of the existing 
connections between the modifications happened at the level of the accounting variables 
and of the proxy variable for informational efficiency; 
 
Beyond these observations, there are two fundamental questions still looking for an answer: 
How deep is the de facto difference between our proposed model and Gray’s model? and  How 
important is the gnoseological contribution of this model?      
 
An easier construction method of accounting variables is represented by the normalization 
procedures’ choice of intermediary variables. The implicit idea is that a ranking procedure of 
these variables is able to reveal the specific relative differences which appear in the way 
financial reporting systems work and explain non homogenous implementation of some given  
norms, regulations and procedures in an exogenous manner. For example, it is possible to 
estimate the level of the accounting variables accounting according to the following 
procedure:  { }{ } { } ( )14minmax min ..1..1 ..1 kjiskkjisk kj
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where Xa is the level of the accounting variable j from the set s of such variables built based on 
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This formula can be applied if the intermediary variables are supposed to be directly connected 
with the accounting variables. If  per a contrario the connection is seen as a inverse one, then 
the accounting variable should be computed as: 
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Considering the way in which the intermediary variables are defined, relation (14) stands for 
functional conformism and functional transparency; while relation (15) is used to compute the 
hierarchical selectivity, social subordination and cautious approach.   
In conclusion to this paragraph, we consider that the main differences to Gray’s approach 
consist not only in “different labels / different contents” but mainly in the construction of these 
variables based on the World Value Surveys’ components - which are significantly less 
“Western-centered” than Hofstede’s and more able to capture the “true” universal cultural 
dimensions. Of course, this is debatable since IAS/IFRSs and, respectively, US GAAP have 
their roots in the “Anglo-Saxon” perspective and both are currently subject to an on-going 
convergence process. Still, the importance of having a set of “framework-independent” cultural 
and accounting variables consists in an increased capacity of testing how could these be 
implemented in “non Anglo-Saxon” (and “non-Western”) cultures. 
 
3. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: A SAMPLE OF CEE COUNTRIES  
 
In order to include an empirical study case, our paper includes an application of this procedure 
that leads at the estimation of the determinants of the current status of IFRSs implementation, 
specific to accounting values in a sample of Central and Eastern European countries. 
 
Selecting the sample countries 
 
The role of this section is to provide an empirical explanation on how culture interferes with 
individual countries’ decision to permit/require/prohibit IFRSs’ use for the individual financial 
statements of the domestic unlisted entities.  
 
The first step in our empirical analysis consisted in determining the sample countries. Since we 
have considered the EU membership status as a guarantee of the implementation of the acquis 
communitaire, the sample countries were selected amongst the CEE countries, as defined by the 
OECDxi, and simultaneously fulfilling the criteria: 
• These are all CEE countries and share common socio-economic historical background; 
• Each of these countries has national cultural specificity; 
• These are all, at the present time, EU Member States; 
• There are enough available data for constructing the cultural variables based on World 
Values Survey’s questions. 
 
Thus, from the fifteen CEE countries, only nine fulfill the entire set of criteria, as presented in 
Table 7:  
Insert Table 7 
 
There are some issues we would like do address in order to provide a more meaningful 
explanation of our further presented statistical results. Thus, the first issue that we consider 
relevant in our analysis is that the evolution of accounting regulations in the sample CEE 
countries had suffered external influences determined by other national financial reporting 
systems. There can be noticed several external influences, such as: 
• Austrian and German commercial code influenced the accounting regulations in Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland; 
• A French influence is obvious in Romania’s case; 
• A dual French and German influence is detected in Slovakia’s case (PWC, 2004); 
• Latvian accounting was strongly influenced by Danish regulations that meet in general the 
EU’s Directives; 
• Lithuanian accounting regulations makes reference to IAS version before 2001.  
 
The fact is that all the sample countries have elaborated in the early ’90 national laws on 
accounting and auditing separated by the company law. Most of these regulations have been 
subject of a series of modifications in order to align them to the political, social and economic 
objectives of each country. In the majority of the states the essential changes intervened in 2004 
- 2005 as a reflection of the IAS Regulation adopted by the European Union and were 
performed by the state through its main representative, the Ministry of Finance.  
Actually, nowadays, the Ministry of Finance may take several positions such as (Bogdan & 
Cristea, 2008): 
° to continue to establish the domestic accounting regulations (like in Romania); 
° to decide to issue domestic accounting standards. For example, Czech Accounting 
Standards are prepared and published by the Ministry. In this case, the role of the National 
Accounting Board is to comment on exposure drafts, provide interpretations and lobby the 
relevant parties; 
° to delegate some if its responsibilities including that of issuing accounting standards to 
independent bodies. For example, Hungarian Accounting Standards Board has recently been 
established to take over the responsibility for setting Hungarian Accounting Standards from 
the Ministry of Finance. The Board was established by Government Decree 202/2003 under 
the authority of the Accounting Act.  
Many of the countries in our sample have established an apparently independent body to issue 
domestic accounting standards (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Latvia and 
Lithuania). However, the extent of the accounting profession in the elaboration process is not 
quantifiable and some organizations (official website of The Federation of International Trade 
Associations) support the idea that in some countries such as Bulgaria, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Romania the “accountants associations have some difficulties to get 
organized, because of the importance of the State in the accounting system”xii. 
 
All these issues reflect the national diversity within the sample countries as well as a possible 
qualitative explanation of our cultural variables such as social hierarchy significance, freedom 
of initiative and social justice significance.   
 
Hypotheses and statistical results  
 
The next step was that, based on the cultural variables established in the previous section and on 
our previous theoretical considerations to test certain hypotheses in regard to the connections 
between the accounting variables and the option to use IFRSs in the individual financial 
statements of the unlisted entities from the sample countries. These hypotheses could be 
summarized as follows: 
 
H1: A higher level of functional conformism is susceptible to stimulate the adoption of IFRS; 
H2: A functional transparency  is sustained by an “exogenous” implementation of IFRSs; 
H3: A more pronounced preference for the hierarchical selectivity is translated in a higher 
preference for IFRSs’ adoption; 
H4: A superior social justice orientation reflected by a higher social subordination will lead 
to a greater preference for IFRSs; 
H5: A cautious approach as a rational reaction in the face of markets instability will 
encourage the endorsement of uniform standards. 
 
For testing these hypotheses, the methodology implies:  
1. The construction of a fuzzy score variable able to capture the “permitted / required” IFRS 
adoption of the domestic unlisted companies. A possible codification system for the 
construction of this variable is presented in the Annex. 
 
Insert Table 8 
 
This variable takes values in a scale between: 
- “0”  - meaning that the use of IFRSs is prohibited and 
- “2” - reflecting the situation of IFRSs’ requirement; 
 2. The running of a pool data regression between the score variable as endogenous and the 
accounting variables as exogenous ones: 
( )16' iiii Xscore εγβ ++=  
where X ׀ represent the cultural variables, γi signify the cross-section effects and εi are the error 
terms.  
 
The data set with the specific values for the score variable and the cultural ones is presented in 
the Annex. 
Insert Table 9 
 
The main statistics for the stacked cultural data are displayed in the Annex. 
 
Insert Table 10 
 
The accounting values are reported in Table 11 and their general statistic properties are 
displayed in Table 12. 
 
Insert Table 11 
Insert Table 12 
 
It can be noticed that these data are covering a quite wide spectrum of values and, as a 
consequence, these are describing different situations on the level of IFRSs’ adoption. The 
discriminant analysis, along with the scatter plots, suggests that there are some significant 
differences between the components of the analyzed sample due to the non-uniform regulatory 
policies.  
Insert Table 13 
Insert Graphic 2 
 
In this context, by applying the above mentioned methodology to the sample countries, we have 
obtained the results displayed in the Annex. 
 
Insert Table 14 
 
According to these results, we can draw several conclusions: 
? All the H1 – H5 hypotheses are confirmed with different degrees of statistical 
significance; 
?  According to these results, it can be observed that the accounting values with the highest 
explanatory contribution are represented by hierarchic selectivity, social subordination 
and functional transparency, while the least explanatory contribution is functional 
conformism; 
? There can be noticed some important differences between the countries in the sample: 
 
a.   More exactly, one could distinguish, at one extreme, a sub-group 1 composed by Poland, 
and the Baltic countries (especially Latvia and Estonia) - with greater work significance, a 
higher freedom of individual initiative, a medium level of social hierarchy significance and 
a relative important focus on social justice; and consequently with higher degree of 
conformism, transparency (with the significant exception of Poland) and selectivity, a lower 
social subordination and a greater cautious approach in IFRSs’ implementation.  
 
For example, Poland – the country with the most developed financial market in the region, 
Warsaw Stock Exchange (SE), succeeds in having an almost sixteen times Bulgarian SE’s 
market capitalization - is more focused on permitting IFRSs in the individual financial 
statements of companies that have applied for stock exchange listing or whose parent uses 
IFRSs; by prohibiting the use of IFRSs in the separate financial statements of rest of unlisted 
companies. Similar to the other countries entering sub-group 1, Poland has established an 
independent body to issue domestic accounting standards: the Polish Accounting Standards 
Committee set in 2002 issued until January 1, 2007 three standards and two standpoints (on 
accounting for emission rights and on conversion costs for balance sheet valuation).  
Alternatively, Latvia has created Latvian Accounting Board which adopted domestic accounting 
standards in 1999. Nowadays, there are eight standards in force and all the standards have an 
international corresponding standard. The unlisted entities, except the unlisted financial 
institutions, are not permitted to use IFRSs and formats of main financial statements are 
prescribed by the law.  
Thus, Poland and Latvia, by showing more freedom of initiative and a medium level of social 
hierarchy significance, intend to create domestic sets of standards for the unlisted entities. 
 
b.   At the other extreme, a sub-group 2 - formed by Bulgaria and Slovakia with medium work 
significance, lower freedom of individual initiative, greater significance of well-defined 
social hierarchies and medium focus on social justice; and with a lower conformism (more 
evident in Bulgaria’s case), a medium level of transparency (with very close value for our 
measure), a lower level of selectivity, a lower/ medium level of social subordination and 
cautious approach. 
 
For instance, Bulgaria requires the use of IFRSs for the unlisted financial institutions and all 
large unlisted limited liability entities, while other unlisted entities are permitted to use IFRSs. 
The lower freedom of initiative and the greater social hierarchy significance is proven by the 
fact that the accountants association (Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Bulgaria – 
ICPAB) has some difficulties in getting organized and less opportunities in creating an 
independent standard setter.  
4. FINAL CONCLUSIONS  
 
The results presented in the previous section reveal that on a “median” level the accounting 
variables and the characteristics of the regulatory set for the IFRSs’ adoption are significantly 
linked. More generally, the proposed analysis is affected by some important limitations both on 
the theoretical as well as on the empirical level. Among these limitations, one could note: 
 
Theoretical “white spots” 
• How could be “culture” measured? 
The appeal to the Hofstede’s cultural variables could be criticized due to the fact that 
these have obviously a certain self-referential in the “occidental” culture and are not able 
to sustain a more accurate distinction between the characteristics of the cultural artifacts. 
But isn’t the same situation for the World Values Surveys variables? In our opinion, the 
fact that the questions are based on a “valorization approach” for some universal human 
values, addresses at least partially this issue. 
• What is specific for the national differences in the IFRSs adoption? 
There are quite few details about the intrinsic mechanisms of adopting / supervising / 
punishing the non-followers of the regulations for IFRSs and is not very clearly if in fact 
all the required conditions implied by the global decisional framework are fulfilled in this 
particular case and, even more, the decisional particularities are not sufficiently 
highlighted. 
• How feasable is the construction of the accounting variables?  
       The fact that the “translation strategy”, which converts the cultural variable in the                               
“accounting” ones, generates different values as the data set is changed arises an 
intriguing question on the inter-sets comparison. Does this strategy really generate proper 
values for the “accounting” variables? The argument that, inside a given set of 
observations, these values appear as “relative” ones and should be interpreted as “ranks”, 
does not diminish the fact that in a certain sense these are ad hoc constructions and there 
is in fact no clear description of the “translation mechanisms”. 
• What is specific for Central and Eastern European countries? 
It may be observed that there are relative few details about the institutional regulatory 
frameworks and mechanisms of the CEE countries and even less about the linkages 
between the proposed set of variables and the specific accounting systems’ architecture. 
 
Empirical estimation problems 
Thus, in the present paper may be detected some empirical estimation problems connected with: 
• The stability of the regression models and the quality of the results (for instance, in terms 
of properties of the residual variables); 
• The identification problems for the involved parameters; 
• The possible existence of non-linear interactions between the variables and the effects of 
such interactions; 
• The insufficient number of observations and the absence of an explanation for the 
composition of the sample; 
• The fact that the pool data are not constructed based on individual time-series so that there 
is no possibility for cross-section analysis, etc. 
 
Since the above mentioned limitations leave unsolved a series of issues generated by the 
proposed analysis, we consider that a further development of this research is required, mainly on 
the following directions: 
a) To explain some possible translation mechanisms of the cultural values in accounting 
values, by clarifying the relations between the global paradigm and the specific 
accounting “sub-culture”; 
b) To emphasize the impact of institutional harmonization has on the functional aspects of 
the accounting values; 
c) To outline an unified framework able to reflect the structural and functional aspects of 
accounting values’ determinants and changes.  
 
Therefore, despite all these caveats, we argue that the paper can be seen as a small breakdown 
into the usual manner to deal with cultural and accounting variables, related consequences in 
general and with the IFRSs topic in particular. The human species is not motivated in its fight 
for control over the natural and artificial environment only by “rational” motifs. Instead, the 
emotions could balance the logic and fear, solidarity, empathy and hope twins, shaping the way 
in which people do business and live together in the same social realm. 
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ANNEX  
                                
Table 1: The World Values Survey questions 
 
Code of 
Question 
FORMULATION DATA 
REPRESENTS
A005 Please say, for each of the following, how important it is in your life-
Work 
Very important 
A173 Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their 
lives, while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what 
happens to them. Please use this scale where 1 means "none at all" and 10 
means "a great deal" to indicate how much freedom of choice and control 
you feel you have over the way your life turns out. 
None at all 
C013 Here are some more aspects of a job that people say are important. Please 
look at them and tell me which ones you personally think are important in 
a job - Good job security.  
Not mentioned 
C016 Here are some more aspects of a job that people say are important. Please 
look at them and tell me which ones you personally think are important in 
a job?-An opportunity to use initiative 
Not mentioned 
C034 How free are you to make decisions in your job? None at all 
C061 People have different ideas about following instructions at work. Some 
say that one should follow one's superior's instructions even when one 
does not fully agree with them. Others say that one should follow one's 
superior's instructions only when one is convinced that they are right. 
With which of these two opinions do you agree? 
Follow 
instructions 
E163 Would you be prepared to actually do something to improve the 
conditions of Your immediate family? 
Absolutely yes 
F114 Tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can 
always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this 
card. Claiming government benefits to which you are not entitled 
Never 
justifiable 
F116 Tell me for each of the following statements whether you think it can 
always be justified, never be justified, or something in between, using this 
card. Cheating on taxes if you have a chance 
Never 
justifiable 
F145 According to you, how many of your compatriots do the following?-
Claiming state benefits to which they are 
Almost all 
F146 According to you, how many of your compatriots do the following?-
Cheating on tax if they have the chance 
Almost all 
Source: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/; 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: The ranks for “degree of transparency” 
 
  “TRANSPARENCY” “OPACITY” RANK BASED ON " 
TRANSPARENCY" 
RANK BASED ON  
"OPACITY INDEX" 
ARGENTINA 0.27 45 27 30 
AUSTRIA 0.40 25 24 7 
BELGIUM 0.46 27 22 11 
BRAZIL 0.12 40 33 21 
CANADA 0.65 24 9 6 
CHILE 0.25 32 28 14 
CHINA 0.72 48 6 34 
COLOMBIA 0.22 42 30 24 
CZECH 
REPUBLIC 
0.63 41 11 23 
DENMARK 0.97 22 2 4 
FINLAND 0.66 17 8 2 
FRANCE 0.34 39 25 19 
GREECE 0.51 40 18 21 
HUNGARY 0.55 38 15 17 
INDIA 0.22 44 29 28 
INDONESIA 0.06 56 37 37 
IRELAND 0.68 25 7 7 
ITALY 0.47 44 20 28 
JAPAN 0.77 26 4 10 
REPUBLIC OF 
KOREA 
0.45 38 23 17 
MEXICO 0.09 43 34 25 
NETHERLANDS 0.74 23 5 5 
NIGERIA  0.06 60 36 38 
PAKISTAN 0.49 45 19 30 
PHILLIPINES 0.00 50 38 35 
POLAND 0.21 43 31 25 
PORTUGAL 0.53 39 17 19 
RUSSIAN 
FEDERATION 
0.53 45 16 30 
SAUDI ARABI 0.46 52 21 36 
SINGAPORE 0.64 28 10 13 
SOUTH AFRICA 0.18 32 32 14 
SPAIN 0.58 36 14 16 
SWEDEN 0.61 25 13 7 
TURKEY 0.07 43 35 25 
EGYPT 0.30 47 26 33 
GREAT 
BRITAIN 
1.00 14 1 1 
UNITED 
STATES 
0.62 21 12 3 
GERMANY 0.94 27 3 11 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graphic 1: The scatterplots for transparency and GNI per capita 
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Note: For GNI data the source is: The World Bank Group (2008) 
(http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DATASTATISTICS). The data represents non-weighted 
averages for 2000-2007 
 
Table 3: Hofstede’s cultural variables and Hierarchical selectivity 
 
Country Power Distance 
Index 
Individualism Uncertainty 
Avoidance Index 
Hierarchical 
selectivity 
Austria 11 55 70 0.0000 
Belgium 65 75 94 0.2233 
Czech Republic 57 58 74 0.2061 
Denmark 18 74 23 0.3454 
Finland 33 63 59 0.1992 
France 68 71 86 0.3083 
Germany 35 67 65 0.3484 
Greece 60 35 112 0.0654 
Hungary 46 55 82 0.5487 
Italy 50 76 75 0.0614 
Netherlands 38 80 53 0.1081 
Norway 31 69 50 0.9191 
Poland 68 60 93 0.0042 
Portugal 63 27 104 0.5537 
Spain 57 51 86 0.5105 
Sweden 31 71 29 0.4354 
Averages for continental 
European countries 
45.69 61.69 72.19 0.30 
United Kingdom 35 89 35 0.5879 
United States 40 91 46 1.0000 
Ireland 28 70 35 0.6644 
Romania 
Bulgaria 
via 
Poland 
Lithuania 
Estonia 
Czech 
Republic 
Hungary 
Slovakia 
Note: The Hofstede cultural variables values are from: http://www.clearlycultural.com/geert-hofstede-
cultural-dimensions/, (2008) 
 
Table 4: The FTE4Good Index Series (Data as at: 31/10/2008 FTSE4Good Index Series Values) 
 
Index name Index value 
(LOC) 
TRI (LOC) % Change on 
day 
% Change on 
quarter 
FTSE4Good Europe 
Benchmark Index 
3049.74 3824.25 2.67 -19.73 
FTSE4Good Europe 50 
Index 
2775.51 3516.07 3.02 -17.22 
FTSE4Good UK 
Benchmark Index 
3699.29 4754.62 1.7 -17.44 
FTSE4Good UK 50 
Index 
3742.16 4844.07 1.73 -17.06 
FTSE4Good US 
Benchmark Index 
3561.33 4052.31 1.38 -21.4 
FTSE4Good US 100 
Index 
3429.64 3917.28 1.31 -21.09 
FTSE4Good Global 
Benchmark Index 
4103.58 4866.42 0.19 -29.54 
FTSE4Good Global 100 
Index 
3636.43 4348.31 0.48 -27.32 
Source: FTSE Company (2008) - http://www.ftse.com/objects/csv_to_table.jsp?infoCode=NGF4G&these 
Filters=&csvAll=&theseColumns=MCwxLDIsMyw0&theseTitles=&tableTitle=FTSE4Good%20Index%
20Series%20Values&dl=&p_encoded=1 
 
Table 5: Hofstede’s cultural variables and Social subordination 
 
Country Masculinity Individualism Social subordination
Austria 79 55 0.1728 
Belgium 54 75 0.1349 
Czech Republic 57 58 0.1795 
Denmark 16 74 0.3067 
Finland 26 63 0.1962 
France 43 71 0.1366 
Germany 66 67 0.1781 
Greece 57 35 0.0138 
Hungary 88 55 0.0000 
Italy 70 76 0.0837 
Netherlands 14 80 0.2265 
Norway 8 69 0.9937 
Poland 64 60 0.1547 
Portugal 31 27 0.1184 
Spain 42 51 0.9961 
Sweden 5 71 0.2134 
Averages for continental European countries 45.00 61.69 0.26 
United Kingdom 66 89 0.2041 
United States 62 91 1.0000 
Ireland 68 70 0.1599 
 
Table 6: Uncertainty avoidance and Cautious approach 
 
Country Uncertainty avoidance Cautious approach
Austria 70 0.5718 
Belgium 94 0.1983 
Czech Republic 74 0.0361 
Denmark 23 0.0695 
Finland 59 0.2360 
France 86 0.1891 
Germany 65 0.6735 
Greece 112 0.4182 
Hungary 82 1.0000 
Italy 75 0.3539 
Netherlands 53 0.0000 
Poland 93 0.6037 
Portugal 104 0.3896 
Sweden 29 0.2257 
Averages for continental European countries 72.7857 0.3547 
United Kingdom 35 0.2682 
Ireland 35 0.4101 
 
 
Figure 1: Accounting values and their determinants 
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Table 7:  The countries’ cross section identifiers set 
 
Bulgaria Hungary Poland 
Czech Republic Latvia Romania 
Estonia Lithuania Slovakia 
 
Table 8: The codification system for the domestic unlisted companies- the use of IFRSs 
 (Individual financial statements - IFS) 
 
WEIGHT TYPE of entity THE IFRSS ARE: 
0.5 Financial institution Required=2 Permitted=1 Not permitted / Not mentioned =0 
0.3 Large Required=2 Permitted=1 Not permitted / Not mentioned =0 
0.2 Small and medium Required=2 Permitted=1 Not permitted / Not mentioned =0 
Source: inspired by Use of IFRS by Jurisdiction updated at 17 June 2008, http://www.iasplus.com/ 
country/useias.htm  
 
Table 9: The data set- cultural variables 
 
COUNTRY SCORE NOT  
FREEDOM 
NOT  
WORK 
NOT 
 HIERARCHY 
NOT  
JUSTICE 
NOT  
RISK 
Bulgaria 1.8 1.847 0.486 1.027 -1.259 -0.715 
Czech Republic 0 2.497 0.635 1.187 -1.220 -0.042 
Estonia 1.5 2.327 0.666 1.556 -1.030 -0.132 
Hungary 1 2.031 0.566 0.844 0.033 -1.038 
Latvia 1 1.576 0.361 1.321 -1.577 0.007 
Lithuania 1 1.558 0.612 1.650 -1.265 -0.348 
Poland 0 2.073 0.247 1.366 -1.051 -0.628 
Romania 0 2.034 0.348 1.061 -0.793 -0.407 
Slovakia 2 2.182 0.486 1.091 -0.919 -0.507 
 
Table 10: The variables’ statistics for the stacked data- cultural variables 
 
 SCORE NOT 
FREEDOM 
NOT 
WORK 
NOT 
HIERARCHY 
NOT 
JUSTICE 
NOT  
RISK 
 Mean  0.922222  2.013885  0.489677  1.233750 -1.009052 -0.423319 
 Median  1.000000  2.034202  0.486133  1.187444 -1.051448 -0.407334 
 Maximum  2.000000  2.497453  0.665532  1.650260  0.032814  0.007311 
 Minimum  0.000000  1.557805  0.247180  0.843970 -1.576511 -1.037503 
 Std. Dev.  0.777460  0.314597  0.145038  0.262046  0.452359  0.341500 
 Skewness -0.065023 -0.146807 -0.366632  0.239426  1.313631 -0.351029 
 Kurtosis  1.626039  2.093450  1.841671  2.011332  4.347074  2.213706 
 Jarque-Bera  0.714256  0.340515  0.704776  0.452537  3.268917  0.416679 
 Probability  0.699683  0.843447  0.703007  0.797504  0.195058  0.811932 
 Sum  8.300000  18.12496  4.407089  11.10375 -9.081465 -3.809875 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  4.835556  0.791772  0.168289  0.549345  1.637026  0.932977 
 Cross sections 9 9 9 9 9 9 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: The data set- accounting variables 
 
COUNTRY SCORE Functional  
conformism 
Functional 
 transparency 
Hierarchical 
 selectivity 
Social  
subordination 
Cautious approach
Bulgaria 1.8 0.307346627 0.57117678 0.227278348 0.197403047 0.308367333 
Czech Republic 0 1 0.926727374 0.425992511 0.221609762 0.952699462 
Estonia 1.5 0.818952646 1 0.882966699 0.339404917 0.866400592 
Hungary 1 0.503465804 0.761210223 0 1 0 
Latvia 1 0.019783055 0.271995283 0.591023883 0 1 
Lithuania 1 0 0.873210238 1 0.193362491 0.660349337 
Poland 0 0.547929025 0 0.648056865 0.32626312 0.391481414 
Romania 0 0.506995195 0.241327734 0.269563653 0.486825905 0.603139661 
Slovakia 2 0.663888867 0.57117678 0.305937192 0.408595173 0.508123454 
 
Table 12: The variables’ statistics for the stacked data- accounting variables 
 
 SCORE Functional 
conformism 
Functional 
transparency 
Hierarchic 
selectivity 
Social 
subordination 
Cautious 
approach 
 Mean  0.922222  0.485373  0.579647  0.483424  0.352607  0.587840 
 Median  1.000000  0.506995  0.571177  0.425993  0.326263  0.603140 
 Maximum  2.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000  1.000000 
 Minimum  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
 Std. Dev.  0.777460  0.334803  0.346690  0.325002  0.281086  0.326852 
 Skewness -0.065023 -0.146807 -0.366632  0.239426  1.313631 -0.351029 
 Kurtosis  1.626039  2.093450  1.841671  2.011332  4.347074  2.213706 
 Jarque-Bera  0.714256  0.340515  0.704776  0.452537  3.268917  0.416679 
 Probability  0.699683  0.843447  0.703007  0.797504  0.195058  0.811932 
 Sum  8.300000  4.368361  5.216824  4.350819  3.173464  5.290561 
 Sum Sq. Dev.  4.835556  0.896747  0.961550  0.845012  0.632074  0.854658 
 Cross sections 9 9 9 9 9  
 
Graphic 2 : The scatterplots for accounting variable 
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Table 13: The discriminant analysis- score / accounting variables variables 
 
Group Statistics
.6850 .27359 3 3.000 
.3894 .48077 3 3.000 
.4479 .19019 3 3.000 
.3449 .13359 3 3.000 
.6491 .28342 3 3.000 
.3299 .34453 5 5.000 
.6955 .28436 5 5.000 
.5403 .42462 5 5.000 
.3460 .38499 5 5.000 
.5670 .41056 5 5.000 
.6639 . a 1 1.000 
.5712 . a 1 1.000 
.3059 . a 1 1.000 
.4086 . a 1 1.000 
.5081 . a 1 1.000 
.4854 .33480 9 9.000 
.5796 .34669 9 9.000 
.4834 .32500 9 9.000 
.3526 .28109 9 9.000 
.5878 .32685 9 9.000 
conformism 
transparency 
selectivity 
subordination 
cautious 
conformism 
transparency 
selectivity 
subordination 
cautious 
conformism 
transparency 
selectivity 
subordination 
cautious 
conformism 
transparency 
selectivity 
subordination 
cautious 
score 
.00 
1.00 
2.00 
Total 
Mean Std. Deviation Unweighted Weighted
Valid N (listwise)
Insufficient data a. 
  
 
 
Summary of Canonical Discriminant Functions 
 
Tests of Equality of Group Means
.696 1.308 2 6 .338 
.817 .671 2 6 .546 
.939 .194 2 6 .828 
.994 .017 2 6 .983 
.977 .071 2 6 .932 
conformism
transparency
selectivity 
subordination
cautious 
Wilks' 
Lambda F df1 df2 Sig. 
Pooled Within-Groups Matrices a
.104 .081 -.015 .035 .005
.081 .131 .017 .016 .032
-.015 .017 .132 -.071 .084
.035 .016 -.071 .105 -.090
.005 .032 .084 -.090 .139
1.000 .692 -.127 .335 .039
.692 1.000 .133 .141 .234
-.127 .133 1.000 -.599 .620
.335 .141 -.599 1.000 -.742
.039 .234 .620 -.742 1.000
conformism 
transparency 
selectivity 
subordination
cautious 
conformism 
transparency 
selectivity 
subordination
cautious 
Covariance 
Correlation 
conformism transparency selectivity subordination cautious
The covariance matrix has 6 degrees of freedom.a. 
Covariance Matrices a,b
.075 .124 -.001 -.031 .070
.124 .231 -.032 -.040 .135
-.001 -.032 .036 -.013 -.025
-.031 -.040 -.013 .018 -.020
.070 .135 -.025 -.020 .080
.119 .059 -.022 .068 -.028
.059 .081 .042 .045 -.020
-.022 .042 .180 -.099 .139
.068 .045 -.099 .148 -.125
-.028 -.020 .139 -.125 .169
.112 .035 -.023 .028 .008
.035 .120 .020 .012 .018
-.023 .020 .106 -.054 .063
.028 .012 -.054 .079 -.068
.008 .018 .063 -.068 .107
conformism
transparency
selectivity 
subordination
cautious 
conformism
transparency
selectivity 
subordination
cautious 
conformism
transparency
selectivity 
subordination
cautious 
score 
.00 
1.00 
Total 
conformism transparency selectivity subordination cautious
The group covariance matrix for group 2.00 cannot be computed because there is
insufficient data.
a. 
The total covariance matrix has 8 degrees of freedom.b. 
Eigenvalues
2.248 a 97.2 97.2 .832 
.064 a 2.8 100.0 .245 
Function
1 
2 
Eigenvalue % of Variance Cumulative %
Canonical
Correlation
First 2 canonical discriminant functions were used in the
analysis.
a. 
  
 
 
 
Classification Statistics 
 
Wilks' Lambda
.289 4.960 10 .894 
.940 .248 4 .993 
Test of Function(s) 
1 through 2
2 
Wilks'
Lambda Chi-square df Sig. 
1.338 -.321
-1.301 -.560
.029 .827
-.031 1.010
.280 .836
conformism 
transparency 
selectivity 
subordination 
cautious 
1 2
Function
Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients
Structure Matrix
-.121 .707 *
.068 .456 *
.434 -.442 *
-.310 -.334 *
.009 -.292 *
selectivity 
cautious 
conformism 
transparency 
subordination
1 2
Function
Pooled within-groups correlations between discriminating
variables and standardized canonical discriminant functions
Variables ordered by absolute size of correlation within function.
Largest absolute correlation between each variable and
any discriminant function
*. 
Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients
4.147 -.995
-3.596 -1.546
.078 2.275
-.097 3.122
.751 2.241
-.373 -2.138
conformism 
transparency 
selectivity
subordination
cautious
(Constant) 
1 2
Function
Unstandardized coefficients
Functions at Group Centroids
1.556 .128
-1.072 .038
.692 -.572
score
.00 
1.00 
2.00 
1 2
Function
Unstandardized canonical discriminant
functions evaluated at group means
Prior Probabilities for Groups
.333 3 3.000
.333 5 5.000
.333 1 1.000
1.000 9 9.000
score 
.00 
1.00 
2.00 
Total
Prior Unweighted Weighted
Cases Used in Analysis
 
Table 14: Pooled One-Stage estimations for score variable based on accounting values 
 
Dependent Variable: Score variable Cross-sections included: 9 
Method: Pooled Least Squares Total pool (balanced) observations: 9 
Included observations: 1 White diagonal standard errors & 
covariance (degree of freedom. corrected) 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Functional conformism 1.204057 0.579968 2.076075 0.0716 
Functional transparency 1.399306 0.405927 3.447186 0.0087 
Hierarchic selectivity 1.344010 0.439494 3.058084 0.0156 
Social subordination 1.231801 0.359132 3.429942 0.0090 
Cautious approach 1.581153 0.525978 3.006118 0.0169 
 
 
                                                 
i Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity. 
ii The adopted framework for the expectations derived from a bounded rationality approach in which the 
information is imperfect but is “completely” used by the social subjects. 
iii All the information about the history and organization of WVS are from WVSs’ website.  
iv http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/2002/072402fyi.html, accessed on November 4, 2008, 9.30 pm 
v http://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/ts032906sat.htm, accessed on November 2, 2008, 7.00 pm 
vi http://www.geert-hofstede.com/ accessed on September 19, 2008, 10.00 pm 
vii http://www.csrnetwork.com/csr.asp, accessed on November 2, 2008, 8.40 pm 
viii www.socialauditnetwork.org.uk, accessed on November 3, 2008, 11.00 pm 
ix The Accountability Principles for Sustainable Development first appeared in 1999. In the 2003 version 
of AA1000AS, these principles were expressed as Materiality, Completeness and Responsiveness, 
underpinned by a “Commitment to Inclusivity”. On October, 24, 2008, AccountAbility announced the 
revisions to its AA1000AS series of standards. The 2008 revisions bring some important changes to these.  
“Inclusivity” is now a “Foundation Principle”, and sits alongside two other principles; Materiality and 
“Responsiveness”, with “Completeness” no longer expressed as a principle. 
x “Sustainability reporting is the practice of measuring, disclosing, and being accountable to internal and  
external stakeholders for organizational performance towards the goal of sustainable development”, 
Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (p.3), http://www.globalreporting.org/ReportingFramework/ 
ReportingFrameworkDownloads/ accessed on November 5, 2008, 10.00 pm 
xi http://www.oecd.org/document/45/0,2340,en_2649_34291_1963117_1_1_1_1,00.html accessed on July 
16, 2008, 11.50 a.m. 
xii The Federation of International Trade Associations’ website: http://www.fita.org/ accessed on May 26, 
2008, 9.00 pm 
 
 
Classification Function Coefficients
6.273 -4.536 3.385
-7.714 1.877 -3.522
5.739 5.328 4.079
19.178 19.150 17.076
15.085 12.910 12.868
-11.234 -9.416 -8.598
conformism 
transparency 
selectivity 
subordination
cautious 
(Constant)
.00 1.00 2.00
score
Fisher's linear discriminant functions
